Abstract The successful operation of unmanned air vehicles
We have carried out a survey among researchers and scientists at NASA to study these issues. In this paper, we will rIn mode systems, autonomous operaion iS realized in soft-'~~ware. Autonomy software iS typically highly mission and present major results of this study, discussing the broad spec-. . trum of notions and characteristics of autonomy software and i its challenges for design and development. A main focus of not only jeopardize the mission, but could also endanger human life. For example, a damaged UAV must without huthis survey was to evaluate verification and validation (V&V) man help ean tlbe ab tomavd denselyipopulted issues and challenges, compared to the development of "traditional" safety-critical software. We will discuss important areas for an emergency landing or crash. experts and for the software engineering experts).
In the rest of this paper, we will present results from this survey and discuss characteristics of autonomy software, issues in engineering and verification/validation of those systems. Finally, we present some techniques and advanced V&V tool IEEEAC paper # 1261 IEEthat can help to mitigate the software risks inherent in auton-omy software.
higher level of autonomy, as the software can and has to control the entire system for an extended period of time. Still, the 2. AUTONOMY SOFTWARE system has a fixed "goal" and the number of external (enviWhat is Autonomy Software? ronmental) parameters is relatively small. Subjectively, autonomy software is concerned with the autoAn autonomous planning and scheduling system for a Mars matic control of a system (e.g., UAV, spacecraft, robot, rover) rover (e.g., the PLEXIL [8] planning and execution system) without the need of human intervention or control. A more has an even more complex task. Based upon initial high-level detailed look at the attributes, usually associated with autongoals, the system has to automatically develop a plan on how omy software [7] reveals a broad range from self-diagnosing to achieve this goal. This plan has to fulfill all constraints, beto self-managing and self-adapting. The main point here is fore it can be executed. During the execution of the plan, the that the software actually contains some components for exestate of the system or the environment might change, making cuting actions and making decisions. In principle, the autonit necessary for the autonomous system to re-plan the entire omy software must be able to reason about the environment activity, and possibly even revise achievable goals. and the system itself. that an autonomy software system should contain Al-based
The DART (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous or machine-learning algorithms (3.14/3.17), is agent based Technology) spacecraft2 was intended as a prototype to (3.00/2.17), is model-oriented/model-based (2.57/3.00), or demonstrate automatic (and un-guided) in space rendezvous has non-deterministic elements (3.29/3.00). and docking. Using its on-board sensors (image processing, 3. ENGINEERING AN AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM radar, inertial navigation, and GPS), the autonomy software on-board the spacecraft controls the spacecraft to attempt a An autonomous software system is a complex, safety-critical rendezvous with another satellite without human intervenpiece of software of considerable size. Therefore, autonomy tion. Due to problem(s) not yet determined, however, the apsoftware (as any software) must be designed and engineered proach was automatically aborted before the target had been carefully. In a traditional sense, the software life-cycle phases reached. Such an autonomous software system provides a 3In this paper, with A/B we denote that the mean value of the answers 1www.research.ibm.com/autonomic (on a range from 1 (=disagree) to 5(=fully agree) given by autonomy experts 2www.nasa.gov/mission pages/dart/main/ (A), those given by software engineering experts (B).
of design, implementation, testing, and deployment are dis-to be even less important (2.00/1.33). Good code comments i.e., it might miss to flag errors. However, Coverity rarely produces false warnings, whereas PolySpace produces large Table 1 . Sample Questionnaire for traditional safety-critical numbers of false warnings that the user need to evaluate to decode termine whether they are real errors or not. They also behave quite differently in setup and running times: Coverity is easy to configure and runs in a matter of minutes and PolySpace is very complicated to get running and typically runs for days on 5. RISK MITIGATION programs ofthe order of 30, 000 lines ofcode. Both tools analyze C and C++ programs and they were evaluated on NASA In order to mitigate the risks of using autonomy one can imflight code: one unmanned autonomous mission and a releprove the verification and validation process for such systems.
vant portion of SAFM code. From our survey it emerged that the surveyed autonomy system developers didn't use any special/custom tools for V&V, For model checking we used the Java PathFinder (JPF)7 nor did they consider the current best practices for software model checker for Java code. It is an explicit-state model V&V adequate to ensure reliable autonomous systems will checker that can handle programs up to 10, 000 lines of code. be developed. Current best practice for software V&V is Run-time analysis was done with the commercial Temporal testing, hence we here consider three additional approaches Rover8 tool as well as the special purpose Java tool called to mitigate risk: static analysis, model checking and runtime JPaX [3] . These tools were all evaluated on a Java version of analysis. 8www. time-rover, corn systems we mention above (unmanned and manned NASA main characteristics of a safety-or mission-critical autonomy flight software and the Rover code). These are typical errors software and associated verification and validation challenges that one would anticipate in code and since the three systems seem to be the same across the board, indicating that results are all autonomy related therefor also in autonomy code.
of our survey can be carried over to other application domains like UAV. After analyzing the three systems with the given techniques we formed a qualitative view of the risk mitigation obtained
The main findings of the survey were: by each tool -the results are shown in Table 2 . Note that although the experiments reported in [1] produced quantitative . NASA autonomy experts considered there to be no meanresults, the analyzes done here were not done in a controlled ingful difference between autonomy software and nonfashion and hence the results are not as precise.
autonomy software in its structure, development process, and V&V process. Whereas software engineering experts beOnly in two cases did our experiments validate instances lieved that there would be a difference in development and where we believed our tools will perform well and it ac-V&V process. tually did perform well: Coverity on finding uninitialized . There was however consensus that current best practices variables and model checking with JPF for detecting deadin V&V is not suitable for autonomy software. A previous locks/dataraces. The worst cases are when we believed the experiment [1], where it was shown that testing (i.e. current tools can perform a good job and then they are either not apbest practice) does not find as many defects as more advanced plicable at all or they perform very badly. For example, we V&V techniques, also supports this view. believed Coverity can detect divide-by-zero errors, but in fact it cannot and similarly, although PolySpace can detect these However as the qualitative results in 
